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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether a political committee that makes
highly restricted direct contributions has a First
Amendment right to engage in unrestricted noncontribution activities through a separate and
segregated non-contribution account.
2.
Whether the First Amendment forbids a
government from restricting political speech based
on the disclosure interest—an interest in providing
the electorate with information about the sources of
election-related spending—including when a more
narrowly tailored remedy is available.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEDINGS
The Petitioners are Stop This Insanity, Inc., Stop
This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund, and
Glengary Inc. Petitioners were plaintiffs and appellants below.
The Respondent is the Federal Election Commission, which was defendant and appellee below.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Stop This Insanity, Inc. (“STII”) and
Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund
(“ELF”) respectfully petition this Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is reported at 761
F.3d 10 and is reproduced at page 1a of the appendix
to this petition (“App.”). The opinion of the District
Court is reported at 902 F.Supp.2d 23 and
reproduced at App. 15a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was entered on
August 5, 2014. App. 1a. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The text of the relevant statutes is set forth in
the appendix to this petition. App. 71a.
INTRODUCTION
This case presents questions of exceptional
importance on the political speech rights of the
majority of all PACs. The Fifth Circuit recently
opined that contributions designated solely for use in
independent expenditures1 by hybrid PACs “appears
1 An “independent expenditure” means “an expenditure by a

person—(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert
or cooperation with or at the request of such candidate, the
candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a
political party committee or its agents.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17).
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destined to be a coming campaign-finance law
battleground.” Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v.
Reisman (“Catholic Leadership Coalition”), 2014 WL
3930139, at *25 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2014). In that
case, the Fifth Circuit further deepened a circuit
split already advanced by the D.C. Circuit’s decision
in this case.
ELF is a connected PAC—a political advocacy
organization that is connected to another
organization, such as a corporation or a labor union,
and can make direct contributions to candidates.
ELF, as a connected PAC, is not required to disclose
the amount of funds for operating expenses received
from the organization to which it is connected. And
under the Federal Election Commission’s (the
“Commission”) interpretation of campaign finance
statutes, ELF’s minor disclosure exemption allows
the government to tell ELF that it cannot distribute
a pamphlet or send an email to anyone outside of a
“restricted class”—comprised mostly of its coupledozen employees and their spouses—touting its
political views and asking for funds to further spread
its message.
ELF has sought to become a “hybrid PAC” by
creating a separate bank account from that used to
solicit, receive, and expend amount- and sourcerestricted funds from its restricted class. It would
receive funds from outside its restricted class for that
non-contribution account2—consistent with the
2 Petitioners use the term “non-contribution account,” rather

than the “independent expenditure-only account” because the
Commission uses the latter term in referencing Independent
Expenditure-Only PACs (colloquially known as “Super PACs”)
and the former term in referring to the separate bank account
hybrid PACs deposit contributions into “for the purposes of
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existing regulatory framework created by the
Commission since Citizens United for precisely this
activity—and would engage in only non-contribution
expenditures. Even if ELF was to eschew the narrow
disclosure exemption it receives, and announce every
penny its connected organization, STII, gives it—
including contributions to its candidate-contribution
activities—under the Commission’s interpretation of
relevant statutes, ELF still could not form this
separate account to further its political speech.
Here, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the Commission—joining the Second Circuit in a conflict with
the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit over whether
laws capping contributions to hybrid PACs for noncontribution expenditures and other restrictions on
non-contribution activities are constitutionally
permissible.
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit upheld limitations
involving constitutionally protected political speech
rights of an organization, based on the court’s
wrongly-held belief that the organization’s connected
corporation is “an unrestrained vehicle” for unlimited
speech. In so doing, it became the first federal
financing independent expenditures, other advertisements that
refer to a Federal candidate, and generic voter drives.” FEC
STATEMENT ON CAREY V. FEC: REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR
POLITICAL COMMITTEES THAT MAINTAIN A NON-CONTRIBUTION
ACCOUNT
(Oct.
5,
2011),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml.
Similarly, Petitioners use the terms “non-contribution
expenditures,” and “non-contribution activities,” rather than
“independent expenditures,” and “independent expenditure
activities,” for continuity and definitional precision as these
terms include independent expenditures as well as generic
voter drives, etc.
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appellate court to elevate the constitutionally
permissible use of disclosure to a governmental
interest that, in its own right, may justify a
restriction on speech. This reasoning conflicts with a
ruling by the Fifth Circuit, and, if allowed to stand,
gives Congress the power to grant a minor disclosure
exemption to any individual or organization, and
then restrict its ability to speak, based solely on that
white elephant gift.
Over 3,000 connected PACs—constituting more
than half of all federally registered PACs—are
restricted from fully expressing their political views
in the way individuals, other PACs, corporations,
labor unions, and issue advocacy organizations can.
This Court’s intervention is needed to put the issues
here to rest, and to provide guidance to the courts
below as they wade through a host of federal and
state provisions limiting the speech of different
organizational forms—including hybrid PACs—relative to others. This case presents the appropriate
vehicle for providing that guidance.
For these reasons and those that follow, the
Court should grant the petition, and reverse the
judgment below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Act And Its Effect On ELF’s Speech:
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (the
“Act”), a political committee (“PAC”) may register as
an organization called a separate segregated fund,
more commonly known as a “connected PAC.” 52
U.S.C. § 30118(b).3 Connected PACs are connected
3 On August 8, 2014, voting and election provisions located in

Titles 2 and 42 of the United States Code, including the Federal
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to other organizations, such as corporations, labor
unions, and membership or trade associations, and
they are limited in how and from whom they may
solicit political contributions, as well as in the
content and character of their speech. See § 30118.4
A connected PAC cannot receive contributions
from any entity, such as a corporation or union, that
is not its connected organization. § 30118(a).5 The
Act also prohibits a connected PAC from soliciting
the general public; it may solicit only the statutory
“restricted class” of its organization, a small subset of
individuals related to the connected organization,
like stockholders, members, and certain categories of
employees. See § 30118(b)(4)(A)-(C). Contributions
that a connected PAC may receive from individuals—
even
those
designated
for
non-contribution
activities—are subject to the same restriction on
contributions to any “traditional” PAC that may use
them for candidate-contribution purposes: a cap of
$5,000 a year. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C). Using the
funds acquired from the restricted class, connected
PACs can engage in any political speech, including
making campaign contributions subject to the
Election Campaign Act, were transferred to Title 52. No
statutory text was altered. The new citations are used herein.
4

In relevant part, a “contribution” includes “any gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office.” See § 30101(8).

5 The connected entity may pay for the establishment,

administration, and solicitation expenses of the connected PAC,
but such payments are expressly excluded from the definition of
“contribution” in the Act. See § 30118(b)(2).
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applicable limits.
From these limited funds
contributed by a limited selection of individuals, ELF
would be expected to fund all of its speech,
regardless of whether it was a candidatecontribution or a non-contribution expenditure.
Individuals and other organizations—including
non-connected PACs, unions, and corporations—are
not subject to these burdens on funding for noncontribution expenditures. Moreover, PACs are subject to absolute disclosure; whereas other organizational forms are subject to disclosure only on the final, distributed form of its independent expenditures.
Factual Background: ELF is one of over 3,000
connected PACs. ELF’s connected organization is
STII, a social welfare organization that operates as
TheTeaParty.net, one of the nation’s leading “Tea
Party” organizations, and does not make any
political expenditures or contributions. ELF was
founded by employees of STII to increase civic
engagement and promote their values. It does not
coordinate any of its expenditure activities with
candidates or political party committees or their
agents.
ELF currently maintains a direct contribution
bank account subject to the limitations, prohibitions,
and reporting requirements of the Act. It seeks to
further its own political speech on relevant issues by
opening a separate non-contribution account to
solicit funds from the general public to engage in
non-contribution expenditures from that separate
account. Compl. ¶ 28 (filed July 10, 2012). Plaintiff
Glengary Inc. seeks to make contributions to ELF in
excess of current statutory limits for the sole purpose
of advancing ELF’s ability to engage in non-
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contribution expenditures. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 42, 69-70.
Thus, a “non-contribution account” would allow ELF
to solicit and receive contributions from outside of its
restricted class, in any amount, and from any
permissible source and use those funds for noncontribution speech, but not to provide contributions
to candidates.6
ELF does not dispute that
contributions and expenditures from this account
would be subject to the reporting requirements at 52
U.S.C. § 30104(a), 11 C.F.R. § 100.19, and 11 C.F.R.
§ 104.4. Id. at ¶ 2. Nor does ELF assert that the
statutory exemption from the definition of
“contribution” for connected organization funds paid
on behalf of the connected PAC necessarily extends
to non-contribution accounts. Id. at ¶ 12. The
traditional or “restricted class” bank account would
continue to be used for directly contributing to
federal candidates. It also would continue to be
subject to the broad restrictions on solicitation to
only the restricted class, existing amount and source
limits, and regular reporting requirements. Id. at ¶¶
9, 23.
After this Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the Commission’s
consent settlement in Carey v. FEC, 791 F.Supp.2d
121 (D.D.C. 2011),7 ELF believed that its First
Amendment rights permit it to operate a “hybrid”
PAC—one with a restricted account and a separate
non-contribution account. But ELF believed that it
risked prosecution under the Act if it solicited
contributions from outside the restricted class, even
6 Non-contribution accounts also are commonly referred to as

“Carey accounts” by the regulated community.

7 See FEC STATEMENT ON CAREY V. FEC, supra note 2.
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if those funds were solicited into and solely used
through a segregated non-contribution account
consistent with existing regulations. To alleviate its
concerns, ELF submitted an advisory opinion request
to the Commission, AOR 2012-01. Id., Ex. A. The
request asked whether “a connected PAC” may
establish a non-contribution account “to solicit and
accept contributions from the general public, corporations, and unions not subject to the restrictions of
[52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(a)(i)] and [52 U.S.C. §
30118(b)(4)(B)].” Id. at 1, 4. The next month, the
Commission issued two opposing draft advisory
opinions.
Draft Advisory Opinion A (“Draft A”), concluded
that ELF could “establish a non-contribution account
and solicit and accept unlimited contributions from
individuals, other political committees, corporations,
and labor organizations” in addition to STII and its
restricted class, provided that ELF continued to
adhere to the existing restrictions on soliciting
employees. Id., Ex. B at 2. Draft A also looked to the
Commission’s recent consent judgment in Carey,
which stated that the Commission would no longer
enforce regulatory provisions that “prohibit nonconnected political committees from accepting
contributions
from
corporations
and
labor
organizations” nor “limit the amounts permissible
sources may contribute to such accounts.” Id. at 6.
That connected PACs operate differently than
non-connected committees was immaterial to the
constitutionally protected speech at issue. Even
though connected PACs can have their operating
costs paid by the connected organization, Draft A
stated that the differences between the two
structures did not create a different risk of quid pro
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quo corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id.
at 6-7.
Accordingly, there was no compelling
government interest in restricting ELF’s ability to
organize itself as a hybrid PAC that would operate
one account to accept direct candidate-contributable
funds from the restricted class, and a second, noncontribution
account
to
receive
unlimited
contributions for independent expenditures. Id. at 8.
Draft Advisory Opinion B (“Draft B”) emphasized
the differences between connected and non-connected
PACs—in particular, the connected PAC’s ability to
have operating costs paid by the organization to
which it was connected without disclosing such costs
because Congress intentionally exempted them from
the definition of contribution. Id., Ex. C at 6-8.
Thus, the contribution restrictions purportedly were
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 12. Draft B
found the second issue, the solicitation prohibition,
was moot in light of how it resolved the first. Id. at
13.
The Commission later certified that it failed on a
vote of 3-3 to approve either of the advisory opinions.
Id., Ex. D at 1. Accordingly, no four-vote, binding
advisory opinion was issued, and ELF remained at
risk of prosecution if it operated a non-contribution
account. Id. at ¶ 35. Even the Commission itself is
divided on this issue.
Because of the Commission’s failure to issue a
binding advisory opinion, ELF abstained from speech
during the 2012 election season in order to avoid
prosecution. Due to its small restricted class and the
Act’s restrictions on its speech and association, ELF
could not raise sufficient funds to run noncontribution expenditure campaigns. See id. at ¶ 38.
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The Proceedings Below: In June 2012, ELF,
STII, and Glengary Inc.—as well as two individuals
who sought to make contributions designated for
non-contribution expenditures in excess of current
statutory limits to ELF8—filed a complaint
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the Commission from enforcing portions of
the Act as applied to them.
ELF moved for a preliminary injunction shortly
thereafter. See Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (filed July 18,
2012). In response, the Commission moved for
dismissal as a matter of law. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss
(filed Sept. 25, 2012).
On November 6, 2012, the district court disposed
of both motions through an order denying ELF’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and granting the
Commission’s motion to dismiss. App. 15-70a. The
court recognized it was “not the [c]ourt’s prerogative
to question the authority of” the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United, but relying heavily on
Justice Stevens’ “piercing dissent” in Citizens United,
ruled that “[w]hen a single entity is allowed to make
both limited and direct contributions and unlimited
independent expenditures, keeping the bank
accounts for those two purposes separate is simply
insufficient to overcome the appearance that the
8 The two individuals were Todd Cefaratti, Director and Officer

(President) of STII and a member of the restricted class; and
Ladd Ehlinger, a member of the general public. See Compl. ¶¶
19, 26, 27, 66-68. These individuals no longer are parties to
this case as the D.C. Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over
their claims as they “were not made through the en banc
certification process prescribed in 2 U.S.C. § 437h.” App. 5a n.1
(citing Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
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entity is in cahoots with the candidates and parties
that it coordinates with and supports.” App. 54-55a,
64a; see also App. 47a, 34-35a n.13. The court
pushed further, stating that the reasoning
underlying constitutional protection for hybrid PACs
“is naïve and simply out of touch with the American
public’s clear disillusionment with the massive
amounts of private money that have dominated the
political system, particularly since Citizens United.”
App.55a. For that reason, it ruled that the
contribution and solicitation restrictions do not
violate the First Amendment, as applied to ELF.
App. 67-68a.
ELF timely filed a notice of appeal on January 2,
2013. On August 5, 2014, the D.C. Circuit ruled in
favor of the Commission, holding that ELF had no
right to speak due to the connected PAC form being a
purported “statutory artifact,” and the purported fact
that its connected organization, STII, “is already
capable of sweeping solicitation” and “unrestrained”
speech.” App. 13a, 2a. The court dismissed the fact
that ELF is a separate corporation with its own free
speech rights, or that STII has a right not to speak,
and even applied a lower level of scrutiny based on
its belief that there no longer is a practical need to
organize in this way. App. 10a (“this idiosyncratic
and outmoded congressional arrangement is not
deserving of the closest sort of scrutiny”). Thus, the
court determined the constitutional political speech
rights of an organization based on its wrongly-held
belief that the organization’s choice of form is not a
practical vehicle for speech.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case presents critical issues for review on
which the circuits are intractably divided. First, the
circuits are divided on whether segregated noncontribution accounts sufficiently address any
anticorruption rationale for limiting the noncontribution activities of hybrid PACs. Second, the
circuits are divided on whether a disclosure
interest—separate from its permissible use as a tool
of anti-corruption in providing the electorate with
information about the sources of election-related
spending—justifies restrictions on hybrid PACs’ noncontribution activities, and ultimately that of other
organizational forms.
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s decision conflicts
with this Court’s decision in Citizens United and
others that the government cannot restrict political
speech because of the speaker’s organizational
identity. Similarly, it conflicts with this Court’s
decision in Citizens United that non-contribution
expenditures and their attendant fundraising
activities do not implicate the anticorruption interest
as a matter of law. Lastly, the D.C. Circuit’s
definition of the anticorruption interest to include
within its rationale a disclosure interest runs
directly counter to this Court’s decision in Citizens
United and others that the anticorruption interest is
limited to quid pro quo corruption.
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I. THE CIRCUITS ARE INTRACTABLY DIVIDED ON WHETHER A PAC THAT MAKES
RESTRICTED DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS
MAY ENGAGE IN UNRESTRICTED NONCONTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES WITH A
SEPARATE ACCOUNT.
Citizens
United
resolved
the
right
of
corporations,
unions,
nonprofits,
and
other
associations to make non-contribution expenditures
without limits as to their source and amount.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 364-65. Courts
after Citizens United then addressed the next logical
question: whether limitations on contributions to
organizations that make only non-contribution expenditures are constitutional. The courts uniformly
responded by striking down such restrictions. See
Fund For La.’s Future v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 2014 WL
1764781, at *7 (E.D. La. May 2, 2014) (cataloguing
cases); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434,
1442 n.2 (2014) (“A ‘Super PAC’ is a PAC that makes
only independent expenditures . . . . The base and
aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional
PACs, but not to independent expenditure PACs.”).
Now, as recently forewarned by the Fifth Circuit,
contributions designated for use in non-contribution
expenditures by hybrid PACs to accounts restricted
for that purpose “appears destined to be a coming
campaign-finance law battleground.” Catholic Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *25. This
case is that prediction realized.
The lines drawn by the circuits are twofold.
First, the circuits are divided on whether the
existence of a segregated non-contribution account
eliminates the government’s interest in preventing
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actual or apparent corruption (the “anticorruption
interest”)—whether limited to quid pro quo
corruption or broadly construed as including
disclosure as held by the court below. Compare
Republican Party of N.M. v. King (“Republican Party
of New Mexico”), 741 F.3d 1089, 1097-1101 (10th Cir.
2013) with Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell
(“Vermont Right to Life”), 758 F.3d 118, 140-45 (2d
Cir. July 2, 2014); and Stop This Insanity, App. 1213a. Second, the circuits are divided on whether the
disclosure interest justifies restrictions on hybrid
PACs’ non-contribution activities. Compare Catholic
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15-16
and Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard
(“Alabama Democratic Conference”), 541 F. App’x
931, 933 (11th Cir. 2013) with Stop This Insanity,
App. 12-13a.
A. The D.C. and Second Circuits Directly
Conflict with the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits on Whether Hybrid PACs
Can Be Prohibited.
1. The D.C. Circuit’s decision aligns with the
Second Circuit in deepening a direct conflict with the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Republican Party of New
Mexico and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Catholic
Leadership Coalition that laws capping contributions
to non-contribution accounts of hybrid PACs and
other restrictions are constitutionally impermissible.
The Tenth Circuit in Republican Party of New
Mexico analyzed the constitutionality of state laws
prohibiting the solicitation, contribution, and
acceptance of funds greater than $5,000 to PACs—
including hybrid PACs—that were designated for
non-contribution expenditures. 741 F.3d at 1091.
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Granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, the
court expressly rejected the district court’s ruling in
this case that a hybrid PAC’s use of separate bank
accounts for direct contributions and noncontribution expenditures was insufficient to
overcome the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.
Id. at 1101 (“Stop This Insanity does not offer a
compelling rationale why combining two activities,
neither of which by itself is corrupting, into a single
entity suddenly increases the risk of real or apparent
quid pro quo corruption.”).
The court ruled that after Citizens United, a
hybrid PAC’s “direct contribution does not alter the
non-coordinated
nature
of
its
independent
expenditures; there still must be some attendant
coordination with the candidate or political party to
make corruption real or apparent.” Id.9 The court
also reasoned that in any event, the government’s
anticorruption interest with respect to hybrid PACs
was satisfied through both direct contribution limits
and anti-coordination laws. Id. at 1097, 1101.
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit also disagreed
with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach—in an
unpublished disposition—of treating corruption as a
fact based inquiry: “Citizens United did not treat
corruption as a fact question to be resolved on a caseby-case basis. Instead, the Court considered whether
9 See also Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1068 (D. Mont.

2012) (striking down state statute that prevented corporations
from making contributions to hybrid PACs designated for
independent expenditures); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego,
2012 WL 177414, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (striking
down contribution limit as it applied to contributions to hybrid
PACs designated for independent expenditures).
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independent speech is the type that poses a risk of
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.”
Id. at 1096 n.4 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
360).10 Further, the court rejected the Eleventh
Circuit’s suggestion that hybrid PACs could pose a
unique risk of circumvention of individual contribution limits because that scenario “concerns only
the control over the PAC’s agenda. It does not affect
the funds available in the PAC’s hard-money
account, which is subject to strict restrictions on the
amount it may raise from a single donor and
contribute to single candidate.” Id. at 1102 n.9.

10 The Eleventh Circuit, in Alabama Democratic Conference

opinion, considered whether a ban on transfers between PACs
was unconstitutional as applied to a hybrid PAC that wanted to
receive funds from other PACs, which it would then deposit into
a separate bank account used only for non-contribution
expenditures. 541 F. App’x at 932. The court held that in the
as-applied challenge, whether separate accounts eliminated all
corruption concerns was a question of fact and the state had
produced sufficient evidence below to withstand summary
judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 934-36. In so holding,
the court held at that stage of the proceedings, Citizens United
did not render the law unconstitutional because “[i]n
prohibiting limits on independent expenditures, Citizens United
heavily emphasized the independent, non-coordinated nature of
those expenditures, which alleviates concerns about
corruption.” Id. at 935. Thus, the court reasoned, “[w]hen an
organization engages in independent expenditures as well as
campaign contributions . . . its independence may be called into
question and concerns of corruption may reappear. At the very
least, the public may believe that corruption continues to exist,
despite the use of separate bank accounts, because both
accounts are controlled and can be coordinated by the same
entity.” Id.
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Catholic
Leadership Coalition considered facial and as applied
challenges to state laws banning a type of state PAC,
which made both non-contribution expenditures and
direct contributions, from exceeding $500 in
contributions and expenditures until sixty days after
it appointed a treasurer. Id. at *1-5. Relying
primarily on Citizens United and McCutcheon, the
court struck down the 60-day, 500-dollar limit
because it did not directly combat corruption and
rejected the state’s arguments that it was properly
tailored because interested speakers had other
opportunities for speaking during the 60-day period.
Id. at *14, *16-*18 & n.27. Similarly, the court held
that whatever disclosure interest the state had, it
was insufficient to justify the limitation. Id. at *15.
The court also questioned if the D.C. Circuit’s
expansion of the anticorruption interest to include
disclosure in this case “is permissible at all,” but held
that in any event, it was not properly tailored as the
state could address any “loopholes” by strengthening
its disclosure requirements. Id.
The Second Circuit went the other way. In
Vermont Right to Life, the court analyzed an asapplied challenge to a state law setting a $2,000
limit on contributions to PACs from a single source
in any two-year general election cycle. 758 F.3d at
139. After finding that the PAC was a de facto
hybrid PAC and not a true independent expenditure
only PAC because it was enmeshed financially and
organizationally with another PAC that made direct
contributions,11 the court, citing the district court’s
11 But see N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274

(4th Cir. 2008). In Leake, the Fourth Circuit rejected the state’s
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opinion here, held that restrictions on all hybrid
PACs could be justified because having separate
accounts, while potentially relevant, “does not
prevent coordinated expenditures—whereby funds
are spent in coordination with the candidate.” 758
F.3d at 141, 145.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision below similarly held
that restrictions on solicitations and contributions
can validly prohibit a PAC from creating a noncontribution account. The court reasoned that the
decision to form a connected PAC subject to these
restrictions was purely voluntary and an attempt to
avoid disclosure requirements. App. 8-10a; see also
App. 5a, 12a. Conflating the rights of STII and ELF,
it also asserted that nothing prevented STII from
speaking on ELF’s behalf or restricted amount or
manner in which STII could spend money. App. 78a, 11a.
2. In the process, the D.C. Circuit’s decision
resulted in a second circuit split. The decision
conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Catholic
Leadership Coalition, and the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling in Alabama Democratic Conference that the
disclosure interest cannot justify restrictions on
similar argument that a PAC was not actually an independent
expenditure committee because it was “closely intertwined”
with related PACs. Rather, even if it “share[s] staff and
facilities with its sister and parent entities, it is independent as
a matter of law.” Id. at 294 n.8. The court also recognized that
the state was essentially requesting it to pierce the corporate
veil, but it “decline[d] to do so particularly absent any evidence
that the plaintiffs are abusing their legal forms or any legal
authority that considers [political committees] and their
sponsoring corporation as identical entities.” Id. (quotation and
marks omitted).
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funds given to hybrid PACs for non-contribution
expenditures. See App. 12-13a.
The district court here had relied on Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Citizen’s United to find that the
anti-corruption interest justified the restrictions at
issue here. App. 47a, 55-56a. The Commission itself
abandoned that rationale on appeal, instead arguing
that the disclosure interest justified restrictions on
solicitation and contributions. The D.C. Circuit
agreed, ruling in direct conflict with this court that
“the evolving technological and political landscape
has altered the scope of the anticorruption interest”
such that it is not so “anemic” as to be limited to quid
pro quo corruption. App. 12a. It then characterized
McCutcheon as “intimat[ing] disclosure is an obvious
antidote to the anticorruption rationale,” and defined
that rationale with unprecedented breadth in
holding that the disclosure interest falls within it.
See App. 12a.
Using this newly fashioned interest, the court
justified restrictions on ELF’s non-contribution
activities because striking them down would “stifle
the government’s ability to achieve [its] endeavor” in
“protecting the First Amendment rights of the public
to know the identity of those who seek to influence
their vote.” App. 13-14a. But that reasoning stood
against the Eleventh Circuit’s in its unpublished
disposition. Alabama Democratic Conference, 541 F.
App’x at 933 (this Court only has upheld disclosure
requirements because they are “a less restrictive
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of
speech” and “has never held that a government
interest in transparency is sufficient to justify limits
on contributions or expenditures.”). And the Fifth
Circuit followed suit, in its precedential decision,
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expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning on the disclosure interest here. Catholic
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15.
In sum, fundamental disagreements exist among
at least four circuits regarding the constitutionality
of restrictions on hybrid PACs’ non-contribution
activities. This level of uncertainty and patchwork
constitutional protections for core political speech
across the circuits confirm the urgent need for this
Court’s intervention.
B. The Anticorruption And Disclosure
Interests Do Not Justify Restricting
Non-coordinated
Spending
And
Soliciting
For
Non-Contribution
Expenditures.
Citizens United and McCutcheon clarified that
there is only one governmental interest that may
justify restrictions on political speech in connection
with the campaign finance regime: preventing the
appearance of, or actual, quid pro quo corruption.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; McCutcheon, 134
S.Ct. at 1450-51. Mere ingratiation and access do
not suffice. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-60;
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1441, 1452.
In
distinguishing between impermissible quid pro quo
corruption and mere ingratiation and access, the
First Amendment dictates that any uncertainty be
resolved in favor of protecting political speech rather
than suppressing it. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1451.
And this Court has “consistently rejected attempts to
suppress campaign speech based on other legislative
objectives.” Id. at 1450.
In Citizens United, the Court was unequivocal
that independent expenditures are by definition not
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coordinated with candidates and as a matter of law
cannot lead to the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption. Id. at 357, 360; see also Am. Tradition
P’ship, v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012)
(striking down a state law banning corporations from
making expenditures in connection with a candidate
or a political committee that supports or opposes a
candidate or political party).
Under the logic of Citizens United, it follows—as
even the Commission has recognized12—that (1)
soliciting, receiving, and spending money to make
non-contribution
expenditures,
while
(2)
independently making direct candidate contributions
from a separate account that is separately funded
and subject to amount and source restrictions does
not risk the appearance of, or actual, quid pro quo
corruption beyond the scope of the direct
contributions themselves.
But any risk of quid pro quo corruption posed by
the direct contributions already is resolved by the
direct contribution limits, anti-coordination laws,
and anti-bribery laws. See Republican Party of New
Mexico, 741 F.3d at 1101 (“combining two activities,
neither of which by itself is corrupting, into a single
entity [does not] suddenly increase the risk of real or
12 Under current FEC enforcement policy, non-connected

political committees and non-profit entities may engage in
unrestricted independent expenditures and [for non-connected
political committees] restricted direct contributions so long as
they use separate accounts. See, e.g., FEC STATEMENT ON
CAREY V. FEC, supra note 2; Explanation and Justification for
Final Rules on Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, 75
Fed. Reg. 13223, 13224 (Mar. 19, 2010).
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apparent quid pro quo corruption”). Indeed, the
direct contribution limits themselves are merely a
prophylactic measure “because few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo
arrangement.” McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1458
(quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357). Thus,
restricting non-contribution activities on top of these
laws stacks prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis.
Similarly, to the extent that the government’s
interest in preventing corruption also can encompass
regulations that prevent circumvention of laws that
prevent corruption—e.g., contribution limits—the
segregated bank accounts,13 their attendant
accounting requirements, and the other reporting
requirements for PACs ensure that contributions
designated for non-contribution activities will be
used accordingly.14
And once shorn of an anticorruption justification,
there is no constitutionally sufficient interest in
abridging a hybrid PAC’s non-contribution activities.
The disclosure interest fares no better in
justifying restrictions on political speech. Although
the D.C. Circuit is correct that the Court in
McCutcheon recognized that disclosure requirements
may “deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large
13 Indeed, this Court in McCutcheon proposed segregated,

nontransferable accounts as an alternative to restricting direct
contributions through aggregate limits. Id. at 1458.

14 Moreover, the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to any

anti-circumvention corruption interest because multiple
alternatives exist that do not stifle a hybrid PACs noncontribution activities. See id. (detailing alternatives that are
less restrictive than aggregate limits on direct contributions).
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contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity,” 134 S.Ct. at 1459-60 (quotation and marks
omitted), it did not hold that these financial
transactions must be publicly disclosed—only that
disclosure may be adequate and is a constitutionally
permissible means to achieve the anti-corruption
interest. Nor did it come close to suggesting that
minor disclosure exemptions somehow justify
otherwise-unconstitutional restrictions on political
speech.
The Court has sanctioned disclosure requirements because they are “a less restrictive alternative
to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech”
and “do not impose a ceiling on speech.” Id.; Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 369.
See also Catholic
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15 n.25
& 26 (questioning the permissibility of the D.C.
Circuit’s efforts to link disclosure requirements to
the anticorruption interest and recognizing that
disclosure laws “are generally meant to be an
alternative to, and not necessarily a justification for,
the firm limits on political speech set by expenditure
limits). Indeed, the Court appears to have never
held that it is constitutionally permissible to restrict
contributions or expenditures simply by failing to
require disclosure.
To the contrary, in Citizens Against Rent Control
v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), this Court rejected
the government’s assertion that an ordinance
limiting contributions to PACs formed to support or
oppose ballot measures submitted to the public was
necessary as a prophylactic measure to make known
the identity of supporters and opponents of the
measures. Id. at 298-99. The Court reasoned: “The
integrity of the political system will be adequately
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protected if contributors are identified in a public
filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is
thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous
contributions.” Id. at 299-300. Accordingly, because
there was “no significant state or public interest in
curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure,”
the “limits on contributions which in turn limit[ed]
expenditures
plainly
impair[ed]
freedom
of
expression” and were struck down. Id.
In any event, the restrictions here are
asymmetrical to whatever merit a purported
disclosure interest has in abridging ELF’s speech as
applied. The only thing ELF need not report are the
operating costs STII may pay on its behalf with
regard to its direct contribution activities.15 But
STII already discloses its entire operating budget, as
a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation, to the IRS on its
annual form 990 or related forms. Every other dollar
received or disbursed in any way by ELF is disclosed.
Indeed, ELF must report its non-contribution
expenditures like all other PACs. And like the
regulatory scheme at issue in Citizens Against Rent
Control, ELF must disclose contributions it receives
over $200, including contributor name, address,
occupation, and name of employer. See 11 C.F.R. §
104.3; 11 C.F.R. § 114.5. See also Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 338 (detailing some of the disclosures
connected PACs must make).
Likewise, the
connected organization’s identity always is disclosed.
15 ELF does not assert that payments by STII for costs to solicit

the general public for its non-contribution account and
activities are necessarily within the scope of the exemption to
the definition of “contribution;” a determination properly left to
the Court.
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ELF—like all connected PACs—is required to use
the connected organization’s name within its own
name. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.14(c).
That ELF must disclose the names of its
contributors exposes that the D.C. Circuit’s reliance
on a purported disclosure interest is critically flawed.
STII, as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation, can accept
unlimited amounts of donations but is not required
to publicly disclose its donors. The Court recently
recognized this very point in McCutcheon: “The
existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the
movement of money away from entities subject to
disclosure . . . . Individuals can, for example,
contribute
unlimited
amounts
to
501(c)
organizations, which are not required to publicly
disclose their donors.” 134 S.Ct. at 1460 (citing 26
U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3)).
Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s justification of the
restrictions based on a disclosure interest and its
admonishments that “[i]f the Fund wants to solicit
freely, it must do so in the light” rings hollow.
“Rhetoric ought not obscure reality.”
Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 355.
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S HOLDING IN
CITIZENS UNITED THAT THE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROHIBITS POLITICAL
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS BASED ON
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM.
Citizens United is unequivocal in establishing
that the government cannot impose speech-based
restrictions because the speaker is an association
rather than a corporation, a union, or an individual.
Id. at 342-43; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
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435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend on the identity of its source,
whether
corporation,
association,
union,
or
individual.”). Put simply, after Citizens United, the
government cannot penalize “certain disfavored
associations of citizens” because they opt for a
particular organizational form. 558 U.S. at 356.16
These principles extend to connected PACs like
ELF, which is simply a collection of STII’s employees
grouping together seeking to engage in political
speech separately from STII and independently from
any candidates or political parties. See § 30101(4)
(defining political committee).
The D.C. Circuit, however, wrongly refused to
apply Citizens United to this case. First, the court
distinguished Citizens United by conflating ELF’s
separate speech rights with those of STII. See App.
7-8a (holding that Citizens United is inapposite
because “[n]othing prevents the corporation from
speaking on behalf of the PAC; in fact the regulatory
scheme specifically provides for such activity, albeit
with strings attached”). This is flat wrong.17
16 The Supreme Court has thus only recognized one narrow

exception
to
the
prohibition
against
identity-based
distinctions—when the government performs a uniquely
governmental function in limited settings, such as special
restrictions within the military, corrections systems, and public
schools. See id.at 341 (cataloguing cases).

17 The court also characterized Citizens United as “indicat[ing]
these segregated funds were capable of speaking not unduly
restrained by their various obligations” and that it never
“suggest[ed] the statutory scheme for segregated funds
‘muzzled’ their speech.” App. 6-7a. That this Court did not
overturn the restrictions on connected PACs, however, is not
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In Citizens United, this Court expressly
recognized that a connected PAC is a separate
association, distinct from its connected organization.
558 U.S. at 337 (“A PAC is a separate association
from the corporation.”). Thus, the connected PAC’s
speech rights could not be imputed to its connected
organization. Id. (the connected PAC’s “exemption
from [§30118’s] expenditure ban . . . does not allow
corporations to speak”). And contrary to the D.C.
Circuit’s characterization of ELF and STII as “two
parts of the same whole,” see App.11a, they are not.
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s skepticism that ELF
has “a distinct set of constitutional protections
attendant to it,” id., this Court has regularly
reminded the lower courts that organizations such as
connected PACs have First Amendment rights to
engage in political speech. See, e.g., Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 343; see also Catholic Leadership
Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *16 n.27. Indeed,
the Court has expressly rejected the notion that a
connected PAC’s “form of organization or method of
solicitation diminishes [its] entitlement to First
Amendment protection.” FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985).
Further, the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the fact
that STII “begot the fund” and does not exist wholly
because it found them constitutionally permissible; rather, the
restrictions on Citizens United’s speech was the particular
burden on political speech that the Court faced in Citizens
United. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2820 (2011) (rejecting Arizona’s
attempt to distinguish Davis because “the reach of that opinion
is limited to asymmetrical contribution limits. It is because
that was the particular burden on candidate speech we faced in
Davis.”).
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independent from STII could have dangerous, wideranging implications.
Under its reasoning, the
government could restrict the speech of whollyowned subsidiaries of corporations because they do
not exist separately from the control of the company
that owns them. And no PAC or other association of
individuals can exist separately from the desire of its
contributors to speak. That STII may pay for ELF’s
administrative and solicitation costs does not
transform ELF into a mere conduit for STII’s own
speech.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether STII chooses
to speak, how much it chooses to speak, or why it
chooses to speak or not speak. STII is a separate
organization, and its ability to speak is no more
justification for restricting ELF’s speech as does the
right to speak of any other company, person, or
organization.18
The D.C. Circuit’s second reason for finding
Citizens United inapposite fares no better.
Specifically, it refused to sanction what it
18 In any event, STII does not want to speak and it should not

be forced to do so. Its 501(c)(4) status was pending for more
than three years during the time this case arose, which
overlapped with the IRS scandal that occurred from May 2012
through 2013, and is ongoing. See, e.g., Richard Rubin, BigMoney Politics Groups Get Clarity From IRS They Hate,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/bigmoney-politics-groups-get-clarity-from-irs-they-hate.html. And
now, as a 501(c)(4), it is subject to amorphous and confusing
rules about how much political speech it may make before it
risks losing its exempt status. See, e.g., DANIEL WERFEL, IRS,
CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT
PLAN OF ACTION 22, 24-25 (June 24, 2013),
AND
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IRS_InitialAs
sessmentAndPlanOfAction-2013.pdf.
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characterized as the “illogical conclusion” that
Citizens United permits STII and its employees’ to
“do things the hard way”—namely, that instead of
forming a non-connected PAC, they voluntarily
choose a connected PAC despite knowing that
subsidization of their operating costs would require
them to trade their speech rights. App.8-9a.
Citizens United is not inapposite merely because
STII and its employees had the idea to form a
connected PAC. Connected PACs do not cede their
First Amendment rights simply by organizing in a
way that allows them to receive operating expenses
from another organization without disclosing the
amount of operating expenses they receive. Rather,
the court’s reasoning otherwise is based on two
flawed premises: (1) that Congress’s grant of an
exemption enables it to require fundamental speech
rights as the “trade-off”; and (2) the availability of
other avenues of speech for an association’s
constituent parts excuses the imposition of an
unconstitutional speech burden.
Connected PACs are, to be sure, given a
statutory exemption that Congress is under no
obligation to confer. But so too are other associations
and private individuals given all sorts of special
advantages that the government need not confer,
ranging from tax breaks to contract awards to public
employment to outright cash subsidies. See Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). And if the disclosure
exemption creates an unfair advantage or something
that “no political action committee has,” see App. 10a,
it is Congress’s role, not the Judiciary’s, to eliminate
the “advantage” through methods that do not
unnecessarily abridge the fundamental rights to
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speech and association to which connected PACs and
their contributors are entitled. See McCutcheon, 134
S.Ct. at 1458 (“If Congress agrees that [the ability of
party committees to transfer money freely] is
problematic, it might tighten its permissive transfer
rules. Doing so would impose a lesser burden on
First Amendment rights, as compared to aggregate
limits that flatly ban contributions beyond certain
levels.”).
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the
government cannot exact as the price of a benefit the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.
Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 351 (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Catholic Leadership Coalition,
2014 WL 3930139, *16 n. 27 (rejecting the state’s
argument that because it grants special privileges to
certain types of PACs, it may regulate them as it
pleases without speech restrictions having to
withstand constitutional scrutiny).
But that is
exactly the effect of the D.C. Circuit’s decision.
Congress has not yet changed disclosure requirements for connected PACs in light of Citizens United.
But such Congressional inaction cannot justify the
continued unconstitutional suppression of ELF’s
independent speech.
Importantly, under the D.C. Circuit’s logic, the
government could simply undo Citizens United and
restrict the speech of corporations, labor unions, nonconnected PACs and non-profit entities simply by
granting even minor disclosure exemptions. If the
government can strip constitutional rights by
granting purportedly offsetting statutory benefits, no
speaker is safe from Congress’s generosity.
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Second, under Citizens United and others, the
availability of other avenues of speech for an
association’s constituent parts does not excuse the
imposition of an unconstitutional burden on
organizations wanting to engage in speech. See, e.g.,
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, n.4 (1974)
(per curiam) (Although a prohibition’s effect may be
“‘minuscule and trifling,’” a person “‘is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place’”) (quotation
omitted). Indeed, at the time Citizens United was
decided, the Citizens United organization operated a
connected PAC for a decade and made candidate
contributions. But this did not prevent the Court
from implicitly rejecting Justice Stevens’ position
that if Citizens United wanted to speak right before
the primary, all it needed to do was “abjure business
contributions or use the funds in its PAC, which by
its own account is “one of the most active
conservative PACs in America.” 558 U.S. at 419
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 256 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(banning newspapers’ use of the partnership form
“would be an obvious violation of the First
Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the
conclusion should change when what is at issue is
the pooling of funds for the most important (and
most perennially threatened) category of speech:
electoral speech”); Tex. for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics
Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
state’s argument that “corporations have plenty of
other opportunities for speech—they may speak
themselves or create their own independent PACs”
because this Court has expressly rejected that line of
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reasoning (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357)).
The Act’s limitations on connected PACs must rise
and fall on their own merits.
III. THIS CASE PRESENTS QUESTIONS OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE THAT
SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT.
1. Connected PACs are a major avenue for
political speech.
Thus, the question of what
restrictions on them are constitutionally allowable is
exceptionally important. As of June 30, 2014, of the
5,618 PACs registered with the FEC, 3,042—over
54%—are connected PACs.19 So, far from a “vintage
relic,” App. 6a, this case presents relevant issues for
more than half of the federally-registered PACs in
existence today and any ruling by this Court will
impact the thousands of PACs that hold this form.
Even if true, the D.C. Circuit’s characterization
of connected PACs as “the hard way” of engaging in
associational political speech because they “are no
longer necessary for independent expenditures,” App.
6a, also does not dilute their entitlement to
protection under the First Amendment. That STII’s
employees voluntarily chose to organize ELF as a
connected PAC is not “doing things the hard way.” It
is doing things the “legal and congressionally
sanctioned way.” Their choice of that available mode
of expression is still protected: the First Amendment
mandates that “citizens must be able to discuss
19

See
FEC,
PAC
Count
–
1974
to
Present,
http://www.fec.gov/press/resources/paccount.shtml (last visited
Sept. 28, 2014). In contrast, only 1,701 are Non-connected
PACs, 796 are Independent Expenditure-Only PACs (Super
PACs), and 79 are Non-connected PACs with Non-contribution
accounts.
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issues, great or small, through the means of
expression they deem best suited to their purpose.”
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000); Riley v.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
790–791 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424
(1988).
And necessary or not, connected PACs exist.
Even if the lowly connected PAC organizational form
is utilized, the association has political speech rights
after Citizens United that cannot be infringed upon
for naught. And after Citizens United, “any effort by
the Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be preferred for the particular type of
message and speaker would raise questions as to the
courts’ own lawful authority.” See 558 U.S. at 326.
2. Without the Court’s intervention, there is no
clear answer as to whether laws that burden the
non-contribution activities of these hybrid PACs are
constitutional. The deadlock in the circuits—both on
the constitutionality of restrictions on hybrid PACs
non-contribution activities and on the sufficiency of
the disclosure interest—is clear evidence of the
confusion.
Further, currently, at least 15 states allow some
form of a hybrid PAC, and the Commission similarly
has consented to non-connected PACs making both
restricted direct contributions and unrestricted noncontribution expenditures from separate segregated
accounts. 20 Absent clarity from this court, improper
interpretation will continue to chill, or risk chilling,
20 These include Texas, New Mexico, Alabama, California,

Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia.
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this most fundamental speech. See Citizens United,
333-34; see also U.S. v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335
U.S. 106, 139-40 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring)
(“when regulation or prohibition touches [the making
of political contributions and expenditures], this
Court is duty bound to examine the restrictions and
to decide in its own independent judgment whether
they are abridged within the Amendment’s meaning.
That office cannot be surrendered to legislative
judgment, however weighty”).
3. Lastly, the rights at issue here are of the
utmost importance, necessitating the Court’s
intervention. It is unassailable that political speech
is the primary object of First Amendment protection.
See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
And “[b]ecause the FEC’s business is to censor, there
inheres the danger that [it] may well be less
responsive than a court . . . to the constitutionally
protected interests in free expression.’” Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 355 (quoting Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965)). ELF deserves
court protection now because the right to engage in
political speech is not a boon to be awarded or
restricted at the grace of the Commission or
Congress. Rather, it is a fundamental right of every
person that may not be restricted under the First
Amendment absent an appropriately tailored
restriction that furthers a sufficient government
interest.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be
granted and the judgment below reversed.
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